Chapter VI.2 raising hands and raising sizes in crisis time: early position play

Hello again. Late middle tournament play, or crisis time, is so fundamental to winning and losing a tournament, it may require quite a few subchapters.

This blog I intend to discuss early position hands and raises in the hands just before and during crisis time.

As I have described and you have seen, the table tends to be very tight in early middle play. As the blinds are not worth stealing, the preflop raises are not huge because they are designed to generate the correct type of action, and smaller percentages of your stack are required to make bets which will win pots.

It is important that you recognise the transition period between the two, which is often the first level containing antes, and begin to adjust your play accordingly.

In the last blog, I had introduced the concept of bet sizes calculated to generate certain responses. The obvious counterpoint to that is to play in a manner which will disguise raises intended to get callers and raises intended to get everyone to fold.

Early position raises are very difficult because you have the majority of the table to consider concerning your response. For this reason, as the crisis mounts and more and more hands are subject to raises and theft, early position monsters tend to get sneaky.

It is a well established concept that early position raises should represent strong hands because they will play post flop out of position of most callers. This is less of a consideration at crisis time: the real concern is that with 6-9 players left to act, the raiser will run into a serious showdown hand, so he better have one himself.

We have seen a lot of instances where early position raisers have attempted to use this tactic to disguise the weakness of their hand. This only works to a point, and any showdown of this weak hand will undermine their credibility: We saw Loose and Lucky do it routinely with modest drawing hands, and he was pushed around ever since. I recall being at a table where a player was 2 seats to my left and frequently raised, very large to all in, with small PP's from early position while I was in the blinds. I used this information to my advantage with 10 10 in the BB, knowing that he had pushed with a small PP and that I was a huge favorite. I was right.

In described calling 22 with AA in the last blog. It is clear that his raise was designed to discourage calling, as 10,000 at that table represented 25%-50% of all the players' stacks. This guy had 26000 chips, and he could afford to fold. While a steal offered up 4000 more, this obvious a steal from this position was a very bad gamble. I am sure he knew his caller had a very big hand. AK reraises here. The call was an obvious trap to everyone, but he had trapped himself with a very weak hand. Even I had had QQ, I might have a hard time getting away from my hand in such a large pot with a K on the flop. Just as his raise committed himself to the pot, my call declared a similar commitment.

The moral to this story is that very small to small pocket pairs are very difficult to play in early position. If I am deep stacked, I will play for cheap, limping them in or offering a small raise to help me see what I am up against. If I get action from a short stack, I may gamble. Larger stacks may wish to see a flop. I can drop it against a strong reraise. I will dump it completely preflop if only medium stacked and commit my chips to better opportunities. I may go all in and pray for no callers or a coinflip opportunity if seriously short stacked.

The limp-in and modest raises to open the pot, in fact, disguise my little PP as a much bigger hand attempting to trap! I may get a surprising amount of folders and even take the pot down with a minraise. All players are suspicious of a minraise at this stage as a compromise between a limp trap which might produce a BB special and a proper raise to protect a big hand from getting the wrong kind, and too much, action. This is particularly if I am getting table respect. I will do this with QK and KJ as well, and often find only the BB calls, and when a card I can represent, including an A, hits the flop, and the BB checks (and for some reason I can tell a "please take the pot" check from a "please bet, I am trapping" check, usually by the pause, and this is just long experience on line) A bet of almost any value usually wins the pot whether I have hit or not. This is the level of fear of traps out there in crisis time.

At the same time, making early and middle position raises often in the hands leading up the crisis, and playing them well, provides that necessary table image. This DOES NOT MEAN WINNING EVERY POT AND SHOWING DOWN THE NUTS. THIS INCLUDES THE WILLINGNESS TO CHECK AND FOLD POST FLOP IN POTS YOU OPENED WITH A RAISE.

By doing this, you will do three things:

• Appear to be willing to raise early with less than perfect hands you can get away from;
• Make a post flop bet more likely to induce a fold, as it will be more likely to be respected;
• Allow you to check-call, check-raise, and bet small to induce in-position players to bet into your monster hands and huge flops.

Here are a couple of examples:

It is late into the $200+9 this past Sunday, and I have a modest stack of about 12k. I have been snake bitten after an early fast start, with AQ losing a huge pot to KK on a Q high flop in the second hour, leading to grinding but effective play to chip back up and corresponding table respect. In 4th position with blinds of 300/600, after a number of small grinding pots and steals at this table, I raise to 1800 with 66, and get two bigger stacks calling, as well as the SB, with less than my raise left, pot committed.

Because I have been raising regularly, and the modest state of my stack, I got the action which I did not necessarily want, but I did get the flop. 967 with 2 hearts.

My error here was in conservative play. I pushed all in to protect my set from a flush draw. Because I have table respect, I am put on a big hand and the bigger stacks fold. I regret not gambling with a trapping play, only because the SB sucked out a runner runner straight and took most of the pot from me, but the pot repesented a near double up as it was, and better to be safe than greedy. Greed Kills is my motto, even when I regret a conservative play.

Regardless, showing down 66 in that situation where I had raised was information I was happy to share with the table, because similar raises in similar positions are more likely to get action or suggest I will call raises with more modest hands and gamble out of position in this crucial period.

This is, of course, misinformation.

Unlike the typical "loose aggressive" player who has made his chips with big bets and big folds without necessarily good cards, and we have all seen these donkeys, and get mad when they get lucky, this period is revenge time for the more "solid", i.e. "timid" player once he finally gets that hand he can push all-in with. I have seen so many of these "loose aggressive" types fail to change gears and go from chip leader to chump very rapidly as badly conceived attempted steals equal big payoffs against players with hands they are willing to show down. Sometimes these donkeys get lucky, but more often they pay off.

PokerMonster is, of course, very aware of the nature of crisis time, so he has constructed the image of the "loose aggressive" player TO GET ACTION WHEN HE WANTS IT. I am still scary enough to induce folding when I want to steal and I feel stealing is the right move, but if I have people willing to see a flop with me, especially when I give up position, I am setting them up for monster hands and huge flops leading to big pot takedowns which will move me up the ladder. I am just as selective as the next guy in crisis time, but I mix up my play with the same hands.

(This is, of course, exactly the opposite advice from Phil Gordon. Phil Gordon has just one bracelet, and will be the first to tell you he is a chump at a table of real pros. Tight image to induce folds in crisis time gets you blinds and antes, but never the big pots needed to obtain the stack needed to make and win the final table. Follow Phil and play to get to the money bubble. Follow me and I'll meet you at the final table)

Here is another example from about 15 hands later in the same tournament. I am still stuck at 12,000 (thank you so much Lady Luck!) and in the SB with 22. Yes, Quack Quack, the same hand I destroyed in the last blog.

Blinds are 400/800/100 ante, and 5th position comes in with a modest raise of 2000. The whole table, and I, suspect the trap. The bet was far too low to induce folds. He is begging for action, but fears a BB special. The whole table folds to me. It does not take much to induce me to call only 1200. A BB special you shall have!

In this situation I am looking for a low flop, presumably to defeat AK post flop, but I don't have this player on AK. I, like many players, do not treat AK as a trapping hand. I raise AK big to open pots from all but the late positions: AK is very powerful in crisis time, because holding AK limits the prospects of AA and KK being at the table significantly (but as we have seen from blog 1, this is no guarantee) and what I really want is action from short stacks holding the best hand they have seen in an hour, often AQ-A9 or a small pocket pair. And it is far easier to play AK in a showdown, and far safer against a small stack.

So my mark does not have AK. He has a monster PP. I am pretty satisfied that I will need to flop huge here, but I have an excellent price to do it.

The flop is beautiful. 2-3-4 Rainbow. I immediately think straight draw, but only if my opponent has an Ace, and if he has one, he has two. He definitely DOES NOT HAVE A5 or 56.

I check, and my mark value bets, about 1600. I simply call, as I am not concerned about my mark having any sort of draw in this flop. The turn is the 6 of diamonds, which is interesting, as it put 2 diamonds on the board and improved the straight opportunity. Given that I have demonstrated a gambling nature, and the board is now drawing potentially for me, my prior call on the flop and check on the turn, suggesting I am still drawing (perhaps I have an Ace), produce a panic reaction from my mark. He now wants to end this hand now. He makes an excellent bet, he thinks, 4000: as I have 8000 left he has put me in an "all - in or fold" decision on what he thinks is a draw. I am able to spring my trap, and reraise all -in: he discovers he has now committed himself to the pot, and has to make the call.

He turns over QQ. I am unsurprised, and amused by my genius. Then the 5 hits the river and we split. Lady Luck has been kinder to PokerMonster. If I make both sets I described, I would have been chipped up to 40,000 - 60,000 (depending on whether my set of 6s attracted big stack action: I would have trapped but for the flush draw) and in excellent position with 180 left, 100 in the money, and $150,000 sitting on the final table. Instead I made it into the money.

You can see that QQ was unable to put me on a hand. He assumed I called with Ace high, and, in the situation of that flop, an A has at least 7 outs against QQ, 3 aces and 4 fives, and AK, with 3 Kings, has 10. You can see why he panicked a bit on the turn. I was able to disguise my set as a draw, and his bet was designed to give me very bad odds to catch it.

This, and the next example, show how the big PP trap has its defects. I thought I had successfully disguised myself in the next hand, which occurred later that day in a $100+9 game with 140 players. These games are tighter than the $200+9 for some reason, and it took 3 hours to grind to a modest stack of 12,000 with only one significant boost when my stack of 7000 holding AK made a modest raise to open the pot and called an all-too-quick all in response from the player to the left with 4000 chips: he had QK. Oops.

Anyway, with blinds 150/300/25 ante, I had just raised to open the pot with 3x the blind bets on two prior hands, got action, bad flops, and checked to a bet post flop and folded. I had set up my trap, but I was also down to 8500 chips.

The opportunity comes a few hands later.

The player to my right opened the pot with 900, a dull, standard BY THE BOOK preflop raise (I like to mix up my numbers, and like in this situation, 1100), and I have AA. I simply call.

The flop is a nasty K J 10 rainbow. I do not like this flop, nor do I like the response of my "mark": a "value" bet of 685.

Any small bet which begs a call is suspicious. Sometimes they are probe bets, but more often they are value bets from big flops trying to generate more action. My immediate thought is AQ. I sense serious trouble here. What is really unfortunate is I have AA, and I can't lay down again. I am pot committed because I need AA to hold up this time.

I make the call. The turn is an irrelevant card. He checks and I decide to bet, 2000, praying I am wrong. He reraises me, and I have to put my chips in.

I was almost right. He had 10 10. I definitely smelled the trap.

Developing "set radar" is one of my first acquired skills. I often make the trapping value bet myself with a set when I have the right flop to trap a big PP or if AK or AQ hit top pair. The pros talk about a big bet here, but I like about 2/3 the pot. This value bet was LOW, which triggered my spidey sense. Other triggers are the smooth call in position when you have top pair A kicker and there is NO DRAW ON THE BOARD, and the similar check raise in a multi-player pot when the next player bets and the following calls, WHEN THERE IS A DRAW ON THE BOARD (because player 2 had top pair, and player 3 had the draw, and the set holder wants to push the drawer out, and hopes the top pair has a good enough kicker and not enough common sense to get the hell out too). Heads up, the early player with a set can check call on a drawing flop, as the drawer will likely see a free card, while a made hand bets to protect himself, thus identifying his hand as either top pair or a semi bluff, either of which usually lead to the check-raise, big enough to force the draw out but entice top pair).

Given my predicament, and his hand, I think he played it poorly. I could have had AQ easily given the nature of play. If not, there is a huge draw potential for QK (a likely caller) or QJ (a possible caller). This is potentially the kind of set vs monster draw situation I described in earlier blogs. It is unlikely he had me on a hand, but he, like I, had a monster hand he was going to commit his tournament stakes to, and was willing to gamble himself. Obviously the safe turn card, and my bet which, like in the prior example, was intended to take the pot down, enabled his trap to spring, but I am tricky and just as likely to make that bet with the straight.

Given what I had, and my radar coming on after the post flop bet, should I have folded? I am really unwilling to fold AA in almost all situations. I am 6:1 likely to be ahead post flop with AA, and that is very good odds even without a read on your opponent: this is the luxury of AA. Even so, AA was not beat post flop, it was merely behind. 2 aces and 4 Queens remained available to suckout, about 25% with 2 cards to go, and my AA has caught up from time to time.

One last comment on flops like that K J 10. People tend to play AK, AQ, AJ, A10 as simple "top pair top kicker" ABC hands, and fail to see their potential as drawing hands for straights. I have seen AK and AQ showdown so many times, and AQ vs. KJ, I cannot ignore this potential.

While these two showdown situations appear to offer a clear favorite, these high flops really can alter the odds significantly, because the competing hole cards are interlocking: they contain straight draw outs for the other player, and when two of the cards that make the top end straight (A-K-Q-J-10) hit the flop, one player's top pair or two pair is the other's straight draw, and an overcard and an open ended straight draw, such as AQ vs KJ with a flop of Q-10-rag, is only a 62% favorite with 2 cards to go.

What is most bizarre, and defies both common sense and math, is how many times I have seen the following scenario play out as if scripted:

• AK and AQ go all in preflop
• flop is K-J-rag
• turn or river is the 10 (usually the turn)

The odds computer says AQ is only 16% to catch up but I have seen this OVER AND OVER AND OVER.

The ghost in the machine? Evidence of a Goddess of Poker?

Happy pokering.

Chaper VI: Crisis Time: late Middle Tourney Play

Okay, its been 2 hours + (5 hours + live) of grinding, trapping, sucking out, up down all about, in early middle tourney play. Hopefully you're chipped up, but maybe not. At least your still alive.

Compare your stack to the average and to the blinds. Right around 300/600/75 ante, sometimes a little later, the average stack size/blind size ratio begins to shrink down to 15x. Obviously, if you have 9000 chips at this level, every 10 hands, if you do not play, will pull off 1650, or 18% of your remaining stack disappearing from button to SB. The average stack is in serious trouble. If you have 20,000 chips, you have some space, but you're going to feel a drought of cards soon enough. Even at 30,000 chips you only have 25x the blind, and in 20 minutes or so 600/1200 blinds with 150 ante will come into play and swipe 3200 chips, 10%, from your stack.

This is the critical time the average poker player who has been relying on strong post flop play. A lack of tournament experience as the game moves to this level is the fundamental reason why some players can build up big leads heading up to this level, but start paying off as it arrives. Preflop decisions are critical. Where, before you raised or called no more than 10% of your stack holding AK, and can get away from it if the flop isn't right or make the right move if it is, you're going to find yourself easily committed to a very large pot holding two high cards that missed the flop during crisis time.

Chapter I discussed, as a primer to thinking like a Monster, preflop decisions concerning AK. Time to reread it, because you're going to have to live it.

I just played an online $25+2 game with 350 people in it and finished 11th. For the first three hours, I was on a short stack until a couple of big opportuntities came along. Lets talk about those opportunities and the mistakes made by others I was able to exploit.

For the longest time, I could not get off 3000 chips, and the blinds had reached 150/300. It was crisis time for me, and I hold 88 in the SB. A mid-position player with 5500 chips presses the "bet pot" button for a bet of 800. This is a lazy bet that suggests that no thought went into his raise. The next player beside him (with about 4000 chips) just calls, again relatively swiftly and without great apparent thought.

That "just call" tells me that player two wants to see a flop. The pace of his bet suggests no hint of trapping with a large PP. We have reached a stage where a PP of solid showdown power will be raised to a preflop raiser. The weaker ones will protect themselves into a heads up showdown with raiser by reraising. The "let's see a flop" PP in this situation is typically 77 or lower, any other PP will be raised.

Why is that?

During crisis time, the uncreative, Phil Gordon reading, players in the BB and SB will sometimes, without thinking other than ITS WHAT THE BOOK TOLD ME TO DO, reraise with ANY ACE to protect their blinds. Mathematically, ANY ACE is AK down to A2, 12 possible hands A8 is the 7th worst of them. Holding 88 or better, therefore, makes you a dominating favourite, 68% or better (depending if another Ace folded) against A8, and even slightly better against A7 or worse (this is because, if an A hits, you have 2 live 8s and not just one). If you have to make a move and expect a call from ANY ACE, you have excellent double opportunities available with 88 or better. 77 is slightly behind the curve, and is called "walking sticks" for a real good reason.

You are not pushing here to steal a blind now, you are pushing for action.

In my situation, the lack of any apparent thought to the second player calling does not suggest the consideration of price we see with a small PP or the thoughtful decision making of a very large PP.

I put them both on an Ace, and push my chips in. The first player to act reraises all in, second player (who wanted to see a flop) gets out of the way, and I am racing with AJ.

While AJ involves 2 overcards, the folded A from player 2 leaves AJ with 5 outs only, and makes me again a 70% favorite, especially since he induced the fold.

88 is not as good a favorite if two high aces, say AK and AJ, both show down with him. The existence of 3 overcards and a total of 8 outs and some straight or flush possibilities put me at 45% to win 3 handed, still very good odds given that now I am about to triple up, but we are trying to survive, aren't we? I was able to make that move with 88 because I KNEW my raise would overprice player two's hand, and he would fold.

We can't always KNOW where we stand, but keep in mind that we have spent some considerable time at the table and the tendencies of the players should be very apparent by now. I KNEW player 1 was aggressive and loose. I KNEW player two was tighter, and flop-oriented.

Again, although I walked though the decision making process as if it took me time to make a move, my experience in online poker makes a lot of these decisions intuitive. I delayed no more than a second before deciding my gamble was good. Had I gone into the tank for a bit, I would have informed the rest of the table that I had a tough decision to make, and might be counterproductive. The ability to make these calls fast is as important as making these good decisions.

As we saw in Chapter 1, the timing of making a move with any hand in crisis time is very much situation dependent. Any reasonable PP may be enough in your hand to make a re-raise move, depending on the situation.

Here is another example from live play, thje home game with the boys from last night where I won 2 of three. Because we play 6-8 handed and want to get in 3 tourneys a night, we play a very short stacked game, 500 chips, and crisis time comes fairly early if you have been paying off.

Blinds are 20/40, and there are two limpers before, Al, on the button and with 225 left, pushes all in. I am in the SB and see A10 spades, and I am tempted to make the call, but I have to think. In this looser, short table, often a suited or weaker A is limped in, and there are 2 others who want to see a flop. I decide I don't have two live, even though Al's move suggested some weakness, and dump them. Derek, one of the limpers, makes the call and shows A8. Al turns over 88 and the dominating hand doubles through.

Here's another example from a week ago, again the home game at the same 20/40 level. I have 400 chips, not exactly short stacked, and UTG with 10 10 . There are 2 very aggressive players, Brian and Darryl, in middle position and in the BB. As both these players are preflop raisers, I simply limp in 10 10. Brian raises to 125, and Darryl makes the call. Darryl is looser than Brian, and will tend to call with ANY ACE.

There is 250 in the pot, and I am smelling blood. I go all in, expecting either one or the other to make the call. Brian pushes back all in, forcing Darryl to fold, and turns over AQ. My tens hold up, and then I ask Darryl if he folded A8. I confirmed he did.

Lets say you hold 10 10 at seat nine, you're short stacked, you want to push with it, and you want action. Your move with this hand will depend on two things: the action leading up to you, and the size of the stacks and blinds ahead of you.

This "raise and a call" situation we have described is often perfect to make a move. One or both of those players will very likely be holding A-x. Your prior observations of these players should help put them on hands.

The example I gave offered a pot bet to open, and just a call. Neither bet nor call committed either player to the pot. The first bet was consistent with a blind steal, and that, and its seeming lack of real forethought, strongly suggest he would have been happy stealing the blinds. Player 2 liked the price and the size of the pot, and was not making a move himself. These tells offered me the information to call.

If player one, however, makes a more calculated bet, one which appears to target me, as the short stack in the blinds, that would make me suspicious. Since I have 3000 chips, a bet here of 1200-1600 would commit me to the pot if I call, and would be designed to induce either a fold or a push all in. A very good player will size accordingly, and good players leading up to his target will be notified of his intentions, put him on a hand capable of beating the short stack, and get out of his way. This bettor is counting on me to put him on a blind steal given his later position, and automatically throw A-x back.

Lets put ourselves in the shoes of the player raising into that short stack in the blinds for a moment. As you can see, the bet is calculated to get the action desired. It is too much for any other player to play against unless I ran into a monster, and too much temptation for the short stack to find a double up opportunity. The short stack may be both desperate and inexperience, but will almost automatically recognize that this is not a see a flop and decide situation. The better will not be folding due to his commitment. Might as well commit to the showdown.

(Which is why it was easy to put this less than impressive player on a moderate A with his lazy and unconsidered raise)

Now, if I am Player 2, what appears to be an automatic "let's see a flop" decision requires a lot more thought in crisis time. A simple call is a demonstration of weakness which any good player in front capable of recognizing that weakness will exploit. If I have AQ here, I DO NOT JUST CALL IF A PLAYER IN THE BLINDS IS IN TROUBLE AND HIS STACK IS BIG ENOUGH TO INDUCE A FOLD FROM PLAYER 1. I need to put player 1 on a hand here. Is AQ strong enough to reraise this player? If I put him on a steal, absolutely, and usually all in or so big a raise the original raiser is pot committed. I want to scare off action in front of me and force the raiser to decide whether he wants to gamble AJ for all his chips. His lazy bet in an unopened pot in the last third of the table induces no Spidey-sense alarm here.

I have never seen a short stack in the blinds push A-x against a raise and a re-raise. Only very strong hands can come in against my move, and what I am trying to do here is execute a showdown or a fold against the raiser with my AQ, because I have him on an assumption that his A-crap is the best remaining hand and will be able to take a quick pot down.

I can also feel comfortable about my AQ if the original raiser has been stealing relatively often, has an element of desperation himself. If the raiser has demonstrated a lot of patience, or a very tight image or raising with only very high quality, I probably fold AQ here.

Now, if I am back in the SB, short stacked with 88 and a CALCULATED RAISE followed by ALL IN came at me, I have a tough decision, and stack and bet size are crucial:

1. Is the all in raise a trivial amount for the original raiser because his stack is huge? If so, I will not expect to be isolated with the raiser with my 88, because if I push all in as well, the original raiser has been given very good odds for a call, and he made the calculated raise in the first place which suggested at least a hand good enough to beat A-x. I probably can't call here, and, even if the blinds are huge, only desperation makes this call with the expectation that I will need a lot of luck to survive.
2. If the reraise is HUGE, Player 2 is protecting a good but not killer hand which he thinks is better than the original raiser (who could be as weak as A10 or QK, still hands to race a short stack with), and will beat most of of the cards he would expect me in the short stack to call with. This suggests strongly a hand which will need flop help, an Ace strong enough to dominate most (AK or AQ being the only ones that really qualify here) Now, the prospect that the original raiser likely had an Ace and will likely fold should make me confortable enoughto gamble with 88, unless Player 1 has a huge stack or is a sloppy, thoughtless gambler, both of which we know by now.
3. If the reraise is NOT all in, but one designed to build a bigger pot and help isolate the original raiser, such as a minraise, Player 2 has a very big hand, and 88 is in serious trouble.
   
4. If the player raising is very good or very sneaky (like me), his reaction to the raise may involve misdirection to disguise AA or KK by just calling or overbetting, and a "just call" from The Sneak, especially with any pause which suggested some thought, should give you pause to think yourself.

An example from today:

• I am in middle position with 35k and AA. Blinds are 1000/2000/200 ante. An early player has 26k and bets 10k. As I do not wish to scare off all the action, I simply call, and quickly, as if I wish to see a flop. All the others fold, for good reason. With 25k in the pot, including blinds and antes, player 1 has only 16k left and is very pot committed, and I have made a big commitment to my stack as well. They don't know I have a hand, but they know there will be fireworks post flop from both of us.
• Flop is K high and as I expect, Player 1 moves his chips in, and I make the quick call. He shows down 22 and it does not catch up.

My move on this player achieved my goal. If there was another big hand out there, I want that hand in the pot. If not, I will isolate a man committed to his fortunes on the flop, and expect to win either a big pot heads up or a huge multi-way pot holding AA, as I will be 75% to 82% likely to win this hand. The flop is irrelevant to the fact that two things are guaranteed to happen post flop: he will put his chips in and I will call.

Crisis time can last a long time, and all your preflop decisions will be crucial. Making indiscriminate moves with any PP or AK will guarantee you will not go far. You must look ahead and behind and size your moves to protect your hand from all but your desired goal.

I highly suggest, when you have reached crisis time in a relatively small on line tournament, such as 100-200 players, open all the other tables. My server has a mini-table view for this. Watch the kinds of hands showing down from the stacks when the action comes up. Get a feel for the types of hands desperation sends to the showdown, the kinds of hands that make the calls, and their success rates. I play with two wide-screen monitors so I can do this. Not only is it amusing to watch while you sit patiently looking for your big pot opportunities in crisis time, it should give you a real feel for what is happening. Medium and short stacks will be dropping like flies until 1/2 are gone and the average has doubles, and the smart callers will be getting very, very rich.

Will you be gone or get rich?

I will offer more examples and scenarios for crisis time in my next blog.

V.4 BATTLES IN THE BLINDS: LATE POSITION PLAY: NOT QUITE MONSTER DRAWS

One of the elements of tighter early middle play, especially as it advances to antes, is the occasional hand where the whole table folds to the blinds. Two random cards against two random cards can produce surprising fireworks. If the small blind just completes the bet, and the big blind just calls, it is impossible to put your opponent on a hand. In very early play this hardly matters, as the investment is almost nothing. The antes make for a worthwhile pot, and the price of the blinds start to get worth protecting. Playing well against the other blind player continues to build your reputation as a tough player to play when in the blinds, wins you pots, and occasionally results in big and crucial pots.

I. Playing from the SB.

If I have ANY PLAYABLE hand, particularly mixed paint, an ace, or a pocket pair, I will not limp in.

• A weak ace here usually produces a larger bet designed to force the BB to fold not play back. It is just too difficult out of position to know if A high is good, and the weakness of the kicker, if it catches the flop, may be second or third pair. Easier to just steal here.
• The size of the PP will determine the size of the raise inversely. Weak PP's have the same vulnerability as weak aces post flop: bet to take the pot down. JJ and higher produce options to trap. I have already discussed the cautions here, but the prospect of a BB special is 50% less than a big hand limp-trapping and letting both blinds play cheap and free.
• More flop-dependent drawing hands, from suited connectors to mixed paint, should be raised to 2x-4x the BB, depending on your goal. If you get a call, you have exposed a playable hand and you will need to play cautiously post flop.
• If you have been raising from the small blind regularly with respectable hands and they have been shown, you can set up the occasional SB steal with garbage. Again I refer to the Sklansky-Chubokov numbers which rank all hands based on their value as a SB steal. The general concept is that there is value in the hand moving all-in to steal which is much higher than the value of the hand to make a flop and play a pot. This concept is discussed in Sklansky and Miller's book on holdem theory on the basis of a cash game analysis: the value in mid-tournament with antes to sweeten the pot is much better (as long as you don't do it habitually, as you will get caught eventually). This is the basis for my discussion on raises intended to steal the blinds vs raises intended to define the BB's hand and possibly play post flop. See a flop with QJ, but not with 47, but still raise with QJ enough to force the BB to at lease define his hand as within his parameters of what is playable, and don't be disappointed by a fold, given you still have to play the hand out of position.
  
• If the BB is short stacked, the prospect of stealing becomes remote. As I have stated before, raises into a desperate stack in the BB should be hands with some showdown value or two live value, and all of the hands I have generally described as potential raising hands (ie PPs and mixed paint, and, in this case, unlike late position steals, A-x) should be raised. There is generally no point in limping into a truly desperate BB: he will raise all in almost automatically. If your hand is truly garbage, give the poor player a break and surrender the pot. Garbage is a matter of opinion, and I have been known to push very very loose (J8 springs to mind) when the prospect of 2 live cards in fact give me the pot odds to make this move and show down trash. This is the only time I play pot odds in tournament play, and it usually means the short stack is so low I really am taking minimal risk. Keep in mind that the average random hand in the BB is the playable equivalent of Q7: J8 is in fact 40% likely to beat Q7. If the blinds are 500/1000, antes 100, there are already 2500 chips in the pot. If shortie has 1000 left, and you know he has to push his chips in, you are risking 1500 into a pot of 5000. Adding 30% to a pot you are 40% likely to win is very reasonable. Obviously, if you are that short stacked, the same logic holds true for pushing the chips in, given that you are not up against an opponent who would necessary pay any money to play his hand if he hadn't been in the BB. In either scenario, expect the call and pray.
  
• (as an aside, while I am talking about short stacks in BB's, this pot odd analysis makes a call ALMOST MANDATORY when approaching, or at, the final table, as the value (implied odds) of knocking the player out means either improving your prize or getting you closer to a seat in the final. The reverse is true is you are the SB short stack: if you have a few thousand chips left to pay 5 or 6 hands worth of antes, and the hand is crap, fold and hope to see if someone knocks out before you ante out in order to make the next better final table/in the money prize. Phil Gordon would tell you otherwise. He tells a story in his red book of being short stacked after a bad beat in the BB at a final tbale and making a "pot odds" call with 72 off. When you are so low a double up simply means 8 hands ( or a lot less, if the final table has gotten small) to the blinds to do it again, and you are 70% or worse to lose, the best play is hope two big hands show down before you ante out. I will try to repeat this when I talk of final tables and add some detail and exceptions)
  

Lets say you and the BB are two healthy stacks, you have raised 3x the blind with K10 off suit, and the BB makes the call.

• Any hit or draw from the flop is worth a bet. If you hit top pair, a kicker is usually, but not always, irrelevant. Top pair usually justifies a bet which indicates confidence that you have best hand: middle pair justifies some caution, but should still lead to a bet. A continuation bet may also make sense without catching the flop if the flop represents cards consistent with the size of your raise (ie a Q or K high flop may be worth a stab)
• If you do not have an ace, and your opponent has called your raise, and A high flop hits, it will be difficult to convince him he is in a kicker battle with top pair. Since A -x is often the hand in the BB which will call your raise, it should be easy to put him on top pair. Play cautiously if you have only middle pair, and play to trap if the other two cards have turned into a BB special for you. If you have a draw, the BB may attempt to slow play his A to trap a few more chips from you. Take advantage of the free or cheap card offered, as checks are expected in a battle of the blinds, and he is waiting to you to be persuaded that he doesn't have an A and your middle pair, or the K on the turn, is good.
  

Beware of tell tale BB special signs: time to tell you a horror story that turned into a monster suckout for huge pot:

There is one early limper with 200/400 blinds/50 antes in the local casino $100 tourney. I complete the bet in the SB folding Q4. I have been short stacked all game, and I am sick of it. I have 3000 chips left The BB just calls and we see a Q-5-6 flop. I am the kind of guy who thinks he knows when his Q-crap is good, and make a bet of 1000. BB has me stacked and goes all in, and the limper folds.
I tank for a bit, and declare that I'm not going to give up top pair in a battle of the blinds and make the call.

BB has Q-5. Not only does he have the 2 pair, my kicker is not only bad, its dead. Or is it? I catch runner-runner 3 and 7 to catch a super suckout straight. I was 5% to catch up, and 16% to split (by a 6 or the turn card pairing, as in each case we share the board's 5 as a kicker. I didn't show the math because I cheated and used an odds calculator.

Try not to put all your chips in as a 95% dog, ladies and gentleman. That guy was MAD. But I made the final table.

This story illustrates the danger of not raising preflop from the SB as good as any.

II From the BB.

Since you have position on the SB, take advantage of an SB who just makes the call. You can likely raise with anything to steal, unless the player to your right is a sneaky slow player. You should still raise with a reasonable hand, but raise to invite a call. If you get the call, be concerned, and be leery of a check raise play post flop.

As I have stated, nearly any hand makes a call if the short stack pushes all in from the SB: it is that much more likely a steal, and any solid 2 live or PP situation can be a solid call if you can afford it. Don't bother with true garbage hands unless the price is extremely low, as you don't really want to show the rest of the table that you will make such a call with 10-2 or J-4: This will make you a double up target when you are in the blinds, and will undermine all the effort you have made to make other players leary of stealing from you.

If the SB checks to you, it is usually safe to make the appropriate bet calculated to take the pot. Often a minbet or 150% of the minbet will do. Don't slow play with top pair or middle pair: you are inviting the SB to catch up on the next card, and the primary goal is to put that pot on your stack and get being in the blinds over with.

LATE POSITION PLAY

I have already discussed playing in position in early play, so this discussion will be short.

If you have yourself chipped up nicely while the blinds are still cheap, the conservative nature of the play in early middle play continues opportunities to play interesting drawing hands in very late positions. Unlike early play, however, where 67 sooted might call in late position a 3x blind raise, often called by 2 other players, and see a flop, these hands are much more difficult to play in raised pots at this stage. The raises attract fewer callers, and the raiser is more interested in making the right post flop bet to end the hand in his favour. Heads up in a raised pot with a drawing hand will likely expose the fact you are drawing early and a good player with top pair will force you out of the pot unless you have been consistently outplaying him in previous play. This is always a good thing, as that player wanted action, but not from you, and you may be able to take the pot down on any sign of weakness or a flop which is inconsistent with cards you expect him to be playing.

These drawing hands, however, are very playable in late position when it is still possible to limp in, ideally with a couple of other limpers, but also limped in against the blinds. These hands resemble BB special-type hands, only better because they are sooted and less ragged, and it is safer to play the blinds unraised because the hand in question is looking to make big hands out of flops which would also be the flops a player in the blind might bet out on if he caught a pair, but never very much because of the weaknesses of his position and holdings. You can draw and semi-bluff and outright bluff the blinds with these hands, and, with other limpers, a draw or a piece maybe worth semi bluffing off the flop.

I call this technique, especially the limp in from the button when no one else has come into the pot, a Slow Steal, as your intention is to steal when the blinds check or bet weakly after the flop. While this might induce a steal from the blinds, you might want to call a steal and continue the charade.

• Example: You hold 10-8 clubs on the button and call along with 2 other limpers, and the blinds call.
• Flop is 9 -6 -4 two clubs, giving you a weak flush draw and a gut shot straight draw for 12 outs. This is an ugly flop, and 4 checks to you tell you that the flop is making them sick. It is very easy to make the "take the pot down" bet here, and if a BB special plays back, you have 42% to win a big pot against 2 pair anyway.

If a player bets into you, feel free to call or raise, as you can just as easily represent A9 there, especially if the bet came from the blinds.

Same holds true on the same flop but without the flush draw: Who cares if all you have is one overcard and a gutshot if the blinds are inviting you to take the pot.

Sometimes these drawing hands will produce less obvious or weaker draws which are still worth a call or semi-bluff:

• You hold 910 hearts from the button in the same 5 way limped pot.
• Flop is 7-6-2 rainbow, giving you a gut shot and two overcards. If a blind has Q7 here, he will make a bet. With 2 cards to go, you have 40% to make a winning improvement, and a blind who has bet here and gotten called may very well slow down out of concern you hold 88 or caught a set, offering you an opportunity to either see a free river or take advantage of the weakness of the player in the blinds with a big bluff if the turn is a larger card likely to be among the cards you play in small pots.

That's it for early middle tourney play, although I am sure I missed something. If a scenario comes up which I haven't covered, send a comment and I will tell you how I would have played it.

Obviously, the more your aggressive, smart play grinds up pots for you, the more you stack up, the more you can afford to play a looser, interesting game, and the more likely you run into a huge hand and big pot opportunity.

The goal is to take advantage of the conservative play to keep your stack as far ahead of the blinds as possible. By the time blinds reach 300/600/75 ante, your goal should be around or better than 30k, but 20K will keep you playing. The game will start to get crazy at this level, and the next series of blogs will discuss patience, targeting, and making the right calls when most of your decisions are preflop.

V.3 Playing back from steals, Monsters in the blinds.

Blinds blinds blinds. Why the hell am I spending SO MUCH TIME on what to do with the big and small blinds?

1. You already know how to play a hand you want to play and how to play in position.
2. As the levels go up, and the average stack goes down, your ability to win grinding pots and avoid being treated as an easy mark for blind stealing will keep you chipped up and your stack stable until a double up opportunity emerges.

You are already aware of the tell-tale blind stealing opportunities. When you are sitting there in the BB, and the first 5 to act all fold, the next 3 positions almost never limp in. They may or may not have playable hands, but a cheap flop is no longer the goal. The blinds and antes stolen alone can improve an average stack by 10%, offer a short stack 10 more hands to survive, and allow the big stacks to maintain their iron grip on the table. Even the big stack is waiting for a small stack to feed on, and doesn't like his stack shrinking or a rival emerging while waiting for a hand.

By being protective early in these rounds, you set up yourself as a difficult person to steal from. I am still assuming your stack is average: the big stacks and short stacks are actually safer from the blind thief:

• The big stack is happy to call and play back, and has the economic power to put the raiser all in preflop or on the flop, and the stealer does not want to play a big pot.
• Any short stack who has dropped to 10x the blinds or less sees a huge investment in that blind, and is often getting tired of sitting and waiting and being pushed around, and any reasonable hand may be enough to gamble.

Some late position raises that open the pot may represent genuine raising hands, as no player with a playable hand wants to give the blinds a cheap look with 2 random cards he can't read.

Here's how to spot a genuine hand being raised and not a steal:

• The player has been actively raising, calling and playing post flop from various positions, and has demonstrated routinely that his cards have been genuinely playable when shown, and has not routinely made a raise when stealing opportunities have arisen, especially if he has been winning pots post-flop: The rushing player is enjoying his game and is playing well post flop. He doesn't need to steal to win a pot.
  
• The size of the raising bet is not difficult for the remaining players to call (3x or 4x the blind, for example), does not commit a large percentage of his chips to the stack, or commit any blind player to the pot. Any raise into a truly desperate short stack is likely one that is considerably better than the average 2 random cards and represents a genuine opportunity to knock out the short stack, although sometimes a lazy, inattentive, or desperate player may mistakenly attempt a steal against a pot committed short stack.
• You share the blind with a player with a propensity for frequently playing back against steals with uncallable bets (in which case he is protecting his and your blind against theft).
• The player has demonstrated considerable patience, has not played in some time, and has consistently shown down hands with preflop strengths proportional to the preflop raises he has made (a tight, by the book player).
• In a live tourney, a good look at the player while you reach for chips may offer a tell of whether he is begging for a call or a fold.
• Very good players who have demonstrated a lot of variety of play may wish to disguise a very big hand as a blind steal, particularly if a person in the blinds has been aggressively defending.

If you are of the opinion that the raiser is just stealing, you have many options dependent on the quality of your cards and the state of the raiser:

• I do not advocate the "play back with any Ace" strategy, especially if the thief is pot-committed if you call or raise. A5 is simply not a very strong showdown hand (60%) when 2 live cards in between are in the race with you, and that steal may have been with any Ace -x combination as well. You cannot predict with any accuracy whether you have been outkicked, and you will be racing your kicker. While 2 weak aces often will split the pot, A8 is often strong enough that the 8 will play against the average 5 cards. In addition, a reputation as a "loose caller" will be noted by your opponents, with a short stack holding AQ feeling he has good odds to get action.
• You are safer to rebluff the thief with an uncallable bet when the raiser clearly can afford to fold, especially if the player has shown a tendency to back down to a reraise (although, I will do this a few times to encourage re-raising for when I have an opportunity to disguise a very big hand as a steal.)
• If stealing has been frequent, and there has been very little playing back, putting a thief all in will often be so surprising he has to put you on a hand.
• I will discuss true monsters in the blinds a bit later in the blog, but AK and AQ, in my opinion, unlike my first blog's discussion, have tremendous strength in the blinds against thieves. Because the thief is the only other player to act, you can feel confident about their dominance to a weaker A or K or Q high, and true coin flip value against a pocket pair, keeping in mind that 88 and above a routinely raised at this point in the game, and only KK and AA tend to be played more craftily. The size of the raise will tend to express the vulnerability of the hand of the move-making player, bluffing or not. I frequently raise all in with these hands against late raisers.
• If you have a highly playable hand, including a medium pocket pair, re-raising may not be the best defence. Calling, then betting on a a flop you have hit well or at least represent (like J or Q high) (even 2nd pair, if top card is uninspiring) or on a weak flop may represent 10 10, JJ, or QQ which has the raiser beat. This is effective only when the raiser is not pot-committed.
• Hands with are generally considered to be strong in a heads up situation have calling potential to play the flop in the raised pot. I consider K-x or Q-x suited to be very playable, as long as the kicker is 8 or so high. Pairing that kicker in flop with kicker high or not very much better high can often justify a bet indicating a made hand.
• All the hands which I have described as hands capable of being raised with "2 live value", especially mixed paint, or very good "see a flop" hands when the raiser is not pot committed, and gambling hands when you can afford to gamble the raiser's stack in a showdown. The medium pocket pairs are easier re-raised than called with and played from the flop. The small PPs are, well, a very situation-specific gut check to call, as you offer the opponent at least 50% and maybe better to win most of the time. The former are hands which will usually be 40-60% to win most short stack stealing hands, but the small PPs are so likely to be up against a better PP that I only give them 25% odds to showdown with the thief's usual range of desperation hands. Obviously a very cheap call is a good one, but I wouldn't commit a third of my stack on 44 being good unless you need to gamble yourself and you really think he has A2.
  
• Don't play back every time, and don't call every raise to protect your blind, as some people do. These predictable people become targets for raisers with real hands, not for thieves. A healthy fold every once in a while helps the table respect the honesty of your raises. The re-steal often returns a healthy pot, but if it is over-used, you pay off disastrously eventually. Every decision to play back should be a genuine assessment of the situation facing your blind, and not just an automatic reflex.
• Demonstrating a wild streak at this time in the game, a few strategically placed pre-flop or post flop all-in bets, for example, all in safe situations, may frighten off steals and promote small raises into your blinds instead, which become opportunities to play some unusual hands and win some post-flop pots.
• Just because you have the right kind of hand, the apparent right situation, and the risk is reasonable does not justify a call if your gut is giving off alarm bells. Any hint of strength or deliberate calculation on the part of the raiser should cue to you move with caution, and might justify a fold or a call to see if the flop offers you the green light. This is especially so in a live game where you can see your opponent's reaction to the flop and your reach for your chips.
  

MONSTER IN THE BLIND!

Oh how we love to see AA and KK (QQ will do very nicely too) sitting and waiting for us in the BB or SB. Here, being active previously in the blinds will pay off. Obviously, against a raiser, you want to just call, and feign some thought and concern, and, although it is a gamble, slow play and trap with the big pair. By calling a raise, you have created a very desirable pot, and faking some disappointment in the flop, including a check or weak bet, will usually prompt the raiser to make an attempt to take the pot down. Depending on the size of the bet and the flavour of the flop, you can represent a flush draw and check-call, check-raise a pot committed player, or other trapping techniques. I particularly like the weak bet and raise call which represents a draw, check on a "bad" turn card, and check raise the bet back. If it goes check-check, a value bet on the river might be called or raised. If the player has a big enough stack that a big river bet would be uncallable without a very good hand, that player might make a critical huge bluff on the river. If you smell fear or desperation, feigning weakness may well trigger a big bet.

Obviously, you should make the effort to put your opponent on a hand, and I do not advocate slow-play trapping with flop with a lot of draw potential, especially if your opponent takes an interest in the flop. Take the lead and protect your hand. Don't risk your whole stack getting greedy, and let your AA get busted.

If there are several limpers into the pot, and you have a big PP in the blinds, it is not safe to slow play. Unfortunately, the raise designed to produce one caller coming out of the blinds looks like an attempt to protect a big BB. It will be unlikely you will get action, but AA is safe from being busted.... A bigger raise also risks folds, but a "suspiciously" big raise might induce the small PP limper to gamble what he thinks is a coinflip opportunity to double up. This happens A LOT, because the smaller PP is now assuming that a big A-x is raising to take the pot down, and is putting other limpers or callers on similar holdings.

You may feel safe to slow play a pot with only one limper and the the other blind involved, but every move should be careful. Any hint of a fellow blind player hitting a BB special should cue you to slow down to a crawl. He will be tempted to slow-play it to get more action, and might let you catch up. I have offered a number of prior examples where I have played a hand slowly to keep the pot small and called a value bet on the river to manage my risk with a draw on the board capable of beating my hand. By the river, the made flush or straight will want to make a bet you will call, and a bluffer will not want to get his feet too wet either.

It is not usually profitable to slow play AA if you and the other blind are the only two players in the pot. At best, you will likely win the blinds and antes only, if his hand is truly awful, and at worst, you invite a BB special to bust your AA (of which I have spoken at length in the last blog). It is almost better to represent a steal here, as the other blind with a genuine hand may be willing to call. This will produce the dominating showdown you want with AA or KK. BB battles can involve very big pots with very marginal holdings....and this happens a lot too.

Alas, I have one more blog in me on blinds...the BATTLE OF THE BLINDS (Horrors and Heroes). At some time I will get out of middle-tourney play....but there is so much juicy info to blog on and on and on about.....

Chapter V.2 More play in the blinds: Early Middle Play

A small preamble before the substance of this chapter.

I started doing this blog after a friend of mine, a gamer by nature with a statistics/probability background in the finance biz, started getting hooked on the game and asking more and more detailed and complicated questions. Today I told him to shut up and read the blog, so we can get on playing tennis.

Early on I covered a lot of MATH. Yes, I was a high school math wiz, and a lot of poker is the repetition of the same math problems over and over, just like high school, just disguised as a bunch of cards of different colours. This game will hook you in, and the patterns will emerge from the chaos. You will find you have seen this flop and this situation before (Example: on Wednesday I saw A10 and 44 put their chips all in on a A - 10 -4 flop.) The sense of deja-vu will become inescapable, but experience and good advice will help you avoid the same mistakes twice. When you read the mathy parts, you don't need to follow the calculations, just the concepts: the huge drawing potential of some hands, and how dead a succulent-appearing hand may actually be.

This series of blogs is not meant to be the POKER SATANISTS' ANTI-BIBLE. Even if Poker is followed like a religion with Lady Luck our Goddess, following my style by rote is not my intention.

You will find that, when you finally hit a live table and see who's playing, how many players try to look and play like clones of their pro heroes. You will see (and these are not stereotypes these are observations):

• 20 something white Caucasian males with big baseball hats, huge sunglasses, and bigger headphones: watch them try to play like loose aggressive Young Guns like Scott Fishman:
• Older Oriental men who like to push all in and gamble:
• 20 something oriental men who try to project a Tuan Lee or John Juanda look and play a similar style.

Some of these guys can pull it off and are real players, but these "clones" usually have a flaw: you can predict their play (Loose and Lucky is a Tuan Lee clone, and we discussed his failure to mix his play earlier). These guys are overprojecting their image, and need to play their hands, not their image. If the Young Gun clone is caught raising with crap, everyone will reraise him out of the pot. If the Tuan Lee close is consistently trying to play drawing hands, he will be called or raised preflop and then forced to flod draws with big bets post flop so he can't make his hands. If the OOM is consistently raising big with a large A, he will be trapped easily by observant players with premium hands.

I will give an example of OOM doubling me up.

I have come to the tourney a bit late. The first hand I see is 10 10, and I raise OOM in position and he calls. It is a low flop: he bets small and I simply min raise. When the J hits the turn he pops all in and I have to fold (think Rita Raiser on the short stack). This is early play.

Then I notice through a few hands that he is all in on the flop, or all in on the turn, frequently. I realize this for what it is: he is hoping his opponent can't call, and is afraid of a showdown.

So, again in position, OOM has raised the 50/100 blinds to 250 and I see AA. I intended to raise, but I wind up calling.

With a flop 2-10-J (rainbow), He checks, I bet 500, he calls.

When a K hits the turn, he is (predictably) ALL IN. I call like a shot.

He has QK, and I have 1/4 of his straight draw outs in my hand. He can't catch up.

All these "stereotypes" have the weakness of predictability, and smart players will exploit them. Don't be a PokerMonster clone. As I criticize, critique, and contradict established poker authors, criticize, critique, and contradict me. And experiment. Take the same hands and flops and situations and try them a different way. See how it works for you. Like any great guitarist is a blend of his influences, so is every poker player. You may not like or be comfortable with my style of play, or find that it is not as easy as I make it appear to put people on hands so accurately, and that you cannot make the reads, at least at first, that make this style successful.

You will find at the casino, among with the image-projecting "Clones" a bunch of ordinary people who have put on no face at all. For example, most women I play with who are good players have adopted no "pro style", and are usually a mix of solid poker theory, women's intuition, and their own personality. Some of us mix up image. On Saturday I pulled on the Trogdor hoodie, brought the headphones a prop, and did played the role of Mike the Mouth meets UniBomber. In Wednesday I went corporate casual and kept the comments to myself. Some days I am silly, chatty, loose and wild. Some days I'm silent as a cat on the prowl. I always bring the same game. My game includes misdirection and deception: hence I offer up a very varieties of poker personalities to suit my mood or my goal in a game.

Okay, poker in the blinds.

Great, here comes the big blind. UTG was bad enough, where I limped in 44, the best hand I've seen since Monday, only to be raised and reraised out of the pot to watch a 4 hit the turn card. Now I get to pay off again. Even if the table lets me see the flop, I won't know if I'm good.

Wrong. Learn to enjoy, and thrive in, the challenge of playing from the blinds well.

I have mentioned already some excellent plays coming from the small and big blind, from myself and others. Playing well from these difficult positions will pay off in several ways:

• you win pots (the point of the game!), small usually, but when the antes kick in, the difference between simply surrendering the 400 chips you were forced to post (as well as 10 hands of antes) and picking up 3000 chips will at the minimum keep your stack stable rather than slowly slipping away to nothing a blind and ante at a time:
• Players who respect your play from the blinds and your out-of-position play generally will be reluctant to steal from you for fear of playing a big pot with you with the wrong hand or a bad flop. You will get more limps from the late positions from players who still want to see a flop and win a hand, but would be happier keeping the pot small, so if they are outplayed the payoff is small. You will see more flops and more opportunities for pots form these positions as a result.
  
• Sometimes you will hit MONSTER BB SPECIALS, and, played correctly, can pay off huge. So many of my double ups and knockouts in this portion of the tourney (and, as you can see, we are speaking primarily of the graduation of the game from early middle play to the heart of it, when every pot is critical and the crisis point is drawing near.)

let me start with a small pot story in relatively early play of good blind play when the flop isn't gorgeous for the blinds like 733:

Blinds are 50/100 last saturday, I have recently chipped up with KK, as told. I am in the SB. UTG minraises to 200, and 4th calls too. The rest of the table folds to me, and I see 910 offsuit. This is not an exciting hand, but it is a hand with potential. I have no problem affording 150 on my 50 to see a flop. BB does the same to close the betting

FLOP is 9 Q K rainbow, giving me bottom pair and a gut shot. Certainly nothing to write a blog to the world about, but a piece and a small draw ain't nothing. But Q and K are cards that are quite possibly in early limped hands ( I often play QK UTG with a limp and then call the right raise later, because I like to play this against an ace, I can disguise a pretty strong hand as something else, like a small PP, and get away from it easy if the action in front is heavy or the flop wrong).

I check, and the 3 others playing check behind. No one looks like its a happy flop. If someone had a king with that odd drawing flop (10J has already flopped straight after all, and it gets played...Thanks Doyle, these folks often pay off) I would have expected at least a "lets see where I stand" bet.

With a garbage 3 for a turn card, I check and three check behind. If someone had a Q, I expect that person to bet to see where second pair stands. I strongly suspect that the 9 is good, and I am getting 2 free cards to find a gut shot which will only be beaten by A10. With the river a 5, I still check, the BB checks and the original UTG minraiser decides to make a bet of 450, a little over half the pot. With #4 folding, and the play to me, I strongly suspect A5 suited just tested the waters, J10 is value betting, but, most likely, just a small bluff by a complete miss in a mediocre pot. I tell him I'll look him up, throw in the 450, and ask if my 9 is good. He mucks. I rake.

Never give up on bottom pair. If your cards are still live, keep your head in the hand. My investment of 200 chips picked up a profit of 1050, 10% of the starting stack.

In this tightening portion of the game, the early middle and on, before all hell breaks loose and the short stacks can't handle the blinds any more, you will see very little early position calls or raises. Sometimes there will be no action at all, or just a limp, offering you a cheap look at a flop in the SB or free in the BB.

As you can see, very low flops are presumed to be "BB Special" flops, and a 6 high flop followed by a bet out of the blinds might just end the hand there and rake in, whether you had a piece or not. Certainly, any pair caught in a low card flop may be ahead of the BB and the limper, and a bet is the only way to find out. If you check here from the SB, the others will check, and the K will hit the turn and you will have no chance to represent that K. Your opportunity has been wasted. Because the BB is often willing to give up and move on, the BB will often fold. The limper deliberately minimized his investment, and will fold unless trapping. You can make a very reasonable bet here and see where you stand. Smooth calls to your bet indicate big draws, a low set has been made, or your opponent is feeling lucky. Raises usually mean trapping: the trapper was hoping for a real hand, not a limp in and a bad flop offered to the SB and BB. The trapper wants out of the trap now before it traps him. If you have only one pair, read it for what it is, and oblige. Live, you should get a gut sense of the strength of the hand being trapped (usually AA or KK) from the posture of the limper preflop and his reaction to the flop. You may sense some disappointment from him coming from the lack of action.

Now if you get these tells with a BIG BB SPECIAL FLOP, spring your own trap by betting exactly as if you had made middle pair on that nasty flop: a probe, 2/3 pot size bet will do. The raise will come. If he acts swiftly, reraise all in as swiftly in response: AA is in a panic/blood frenzy, and will throw them in . If the response to your bet is bad acting, and then a raise, do some bad acting yourself, and consider just calling. Another probe bet on the next card (as long as it isn't big and likely to turn a big PP into a set...think A,K,Q, and sometimes J...that set busted your 2 pair or trips).

The trapping PP is especially vulnerable to the BB Special, but BB Specials have vulnerabilities too. A few examples.

• You hold J4 and the flop is J 9 4. Top and bottom pair.
• IF your opponent has AJ, he can bust your 2 pair with his own 2 pair. He has 3 live Aces, 3 live Nines, and 3 live of whatever the turn card is, or 9 outs, as good as a flush draw, but bustable by a 9 or 4, for a net 30%. If he has a flush draw too (the 9 and the 4 are the same suit as his AJ) add 8 outs for 17 outs with 2 cards to go. And he won't be folding this one no matter what your raise. Another monster draw favorite of almost 70% even though you flopped the superior made hand. You have only 4 catch up outs for full house for a net of about 58% in favour for AJ sooted.
  
• IF your opponent has AA you fare better. He has 2 Aces, 3 nines, and three to the turn card to improve, and no flush serious draw unless the board is three of the same suit and he holds the A of that suit (and you would be less enthusiastic about this flop anyway). 8 outs which need to escape your 4 suckout busters gives AA only a 25% suckout rate (which is exactly why AA seems to get burned in this situation so often) The 2 ace outs are unbeatable however, as another card to give you a full made him an Aces Up full.

You are a little better off with top 2 pair but only when your opponent has top pr, live kicker. That kicker must be better than your second pair, but it usually will be.

• Holding J9 on the same J-9-4 flop offers AJ 3 aces and a possible runner runner suckout out only if the turn is 10 or better. This is mathematically less than one net out, since those 4 cards represent 4 of 13 possible ranked turn cards, and that likelihood now needs to hit one of three left If we lower the middle pair a little, the math improves a bit for AJ, but never significantly. You are about 85% likely to win this hand.
• If AJ has the same flush draw as before, he has 9 additional outs to go with his 15% for a net coinflip, not bad if you need to double up, Mr. BB Special, to have J9 be a coinflip for a double up with only 2 cards to cringe at...lets face it, your chips got in before you saw those soots anyway...if you can control the next bet to see a neutral turn card, you have 75% to win and AJ might call your all in bet anyway
• The over PP remains the same 25% to win, as the 3 fours have replaced the 3 nines to make a better 2 pair.

Interestingly enough, bottom 2 pair is as good as top 2 pair:

• your 9-4 in the J - 9 -4 flop vs AJ now offers your opponent 3 Aces, 2 Jacks, and any turn card pair for 3 more outs, or 8 outs rebustable with a 9 or 4. He is now 25%, making bottom 2 here as good as top 2.
• The AA has 2 aces, 3 Jacks, and runner runner turn card for 8 outs for basically the same 25%.

I'm doing the rough math, not the complex math, but you get the picture. Your 2 pair is a big fave unless your opponent has the flush draw.

While I used AA as an example, remember my story about 88 and the 733 flop. A limped in small PP will adore a small flop, and will tend to bet larger than AA or KK here to protect it from being dead to the next card. There may be more overcard runner runner pair potentials, but the prospect of a larger pot far outweighs the few additional outs this may represent to beat you.
While these BB specials have strength, a 25% suckout rate is enough, in my opinion, to protect them, and even more so when there is drawing potential from the flop for straights or flushes. I will usually bet here and judge my next move from the opponent's reaction to the bet. The bet will usually attract top pr A's attention and lead to a raise, while the drawer will be more likely to call.

There are other BB specials out there, and I especially like connectors and even more one off and 2 off (10 -8 or 10-7, for example) in the blinds than played in a late position, because the drawing hand played cheap in late position will be expected and bet out by a player holding top pair or an over pair hand, while the hand is disguised in the blinds, and often players will make a lazy/weak bet after check-check from the blinds to steal the pot. If you have a good draw from these hands here, you might consider betting to keep the limper honest, make him fold, out him on a hand, or make him fear the BB special, making your bet an effective blocking bet at worst, a value bet should you make it, which will earn you more money (especially if you slow down like you didn't like the card that actually gave you the nuts).

If your hand made a nut straight,or you flopped straight AND the board would make it very unlikely your opponent's expected cards have a piece of the straight, such as a very low straight, like the straight I caught playing 66 in an earlier blog, play this hand in whatever manner you think might get some payment back. I might check and wait for the turn to offer a card he either caught or can represent, for example, and maybe just call a turn bet and value bet the river, but if I think the fella is trapping with KK, a value bet will encourage to play back (I believe I introduced my first blog with a comment about beating KK with 56.....now you know)

I have already discussed in prior blogs the danger of 2 pr with a straight draw on the board. Raise big unless the straight draw is unlikely, or slow play and hope the turn is incapable of improving the draw.

Enough for now. PokerMonster's fingers are tired.

Chapter V.1: Early Middle Play: the basics, low PP's and playing the blinds

Okay, lets start this blog off with a poker heaven story.

I'm playing a $10 rebuy turbo and have $40 invested to win a seat in another Sunday game: I seem to be on a roll with these satellites, but I've invested twice as much as usual, and turbos turn into lucky all-in crapshoots, so I;d like to cash in my investment. Blinds are huge with 20 left, 1500/3000, and I'm in 4th with 30000 chips and KK in fifth position, wondering how I'm gonna have to play KK to get paid, when UTG (15k) hits the bet pot button (8000) and #4 (25k) goes all in in front of me. No way #4 has AA...I'm all in too!. UTG calls and THEY BOTH SHOW AK.
My K draw is dead (long live the king), but these two can''t catch their 1.5 live A (no I won't do the math) with 78k and 1 locked, I cruise through to the final table and let the shorter stacks battle it out....7 pay out, so no problem....I only ran into a fellow (sister, really) big stack I limped in A10 with with the shortest stack in the blinds, and she didn't know she was supposed to call and check down, so my A10 went in alone with 22 and couldn't catch...no matter, the game was over the next hand, and I ironically, we all throw in on the last, meaningless hand with me holding...you guessed it....KK....and see AA on the flop and lose the meaningless monster pot to AQ. LOL, as they say in cyberland....

Phil Gordon actually has an amusing and instructive anecdote in his red book on tourneys involving a hot female player as to why you should check down in that situation in a satellite....he's not all bad, he's just simple poker for the masses...he must be saving his tricks for himself. I think I'm just jealous because I'm short.

This is perhaps a good time to provide my musings on check downs, especially in the context of early middle play. In the vast majority of the time in a tournament. CHECKING DOWN THE SHORT STACK in a 3 or 4 handed pot IS STUPID AND A BAD IDEA. But PokerMonster, you say, I bet into a dry pot once and the other guy yelled at me! Checking down is good etiquette!

CHECKING DOWN IS BAD POKER:

• The only player who wants the check down is the other guy, who has a draw on the flop.
• To your surprise, he will bet on the river against your flopped set, and you'll find yourself all-in and beat by a flush or a straight.
• If you've put shortie on a weak A, and you've hit top pr, you have shortie beat. If he flopped a set himself, or came in with AA or KK, he's going to win anyway. Let's keep in mind that if short stack called a big stack's raise all-in, big stack may have been just a bully with trash or a trouble hand, and maybe you should have pushed him out of the pot in the first place, because shortie made his call with a hand that can beat the bully or has some "showdown value" like a small pp hoping to race with A high
  
• If you've made a BIG hand on the flop, a value bet might just piss off your "etiquette first" opponent for breaching etiquette and get you paid off.
• If the flop is miserable (recall how I got AJ and AQ to pay off my KK in an earlier blog) and it looks like you made a bad move, you may need to bet large to protect what is left of your chips (especially if you've called with a stack who has you well covered...he will be happy to build a side pot with you)
• Truly evil and sneaky players (aka ME) will happily make the "just call" with AA just to get a side pot going by giving another person good odds for their money to enter the pot. This is, in fact, a good idea. I HAVE OFTEN BEEN GLAD MY AA HAD A SIDE POT when the short stack sucks out for the main pot. (like I said, shortie may have done a fair share of trapping himself, and may have the best of it).
• If you have a monster preflop hand, and you make the right size here the big stack who initially called (lets assume he's the loose and lucky type, and he thinks pot odds first) may have to call a raise which will commit you both to the pot on the next bet.
  

Checking down is appropriate when:

• Shortie is a very good player who suffered a bad beat to get short and is down on his luck (aka ME, the suckout magnet): better to gang up and get him out than triple him up and make him dangerous again, and these players, brought back to medium stack life, can and will come back to haunt you, often brilliantly, and for all your chips. Make sure you and your fellow caller are of the same opinion and this isn't a double trap, if you can.
• Often at the money bubble a VERY SHORT STACK has finally limped down to little more than the BB, and has hit the blind or is about to be anted out with the BB on his tail, getting that money bubble OVER WITH SO WE CAN PLAY SOME POKER AGAIN (with a cheap call) will lead to a genuine check down. Same thing applies at the final table in the same circumstances (because at these stages every player out means more for you)

Bottom line is early middle play is rarely check down the short stack time. Play your hand, through the streets as appropriate, keeping in mind you can't bluff to win the main pot.

I define "early middle play" as this vague time frame between when the blinds reach 1/10th of the starting stack through the period when antes kick in (for a typical 1500 or 2500 game, 150/300 will level up to 150/300 with 25 ante), and up to the point where the AVERAGE stack creeps ever closer to 10-15 times the BB (Crisis time---late middle play).

Okay, you survived to the first break. Have a good look around the table. To your left is the lucky monster who seemed to lure everyone all -in when he flopped the nuts, and has a crushing stack....several people who doubled and tripled up...and a smattering of short stacks with 2000 chips or less. Some of the bigger stacks were patient, some aggressive, some sucked out with mistakes and haven't pushed their luck since. Some of the short stacks may be good players victimized by bad beats, some may be careful, tight players who simply didn't have the guts to know when to bluff or when second pair or the low pp was good...and have taken down only small pots because they don't know how to be a monster/magnet, and simply squandered small gains seeing a flop and then folding at the sight of any over card.

You have seen the pros on tv, playing final tables, playing middle pair like it was top pr A kicker, and calling an all -in without hesitation and with the best of it. You may have seen Antonio Esfandiari play KK in position against Michael Mizrachi with 2 hearts and an A on board in a raised pot and correctly put MM on the flush draw, but no Ace, and push his chips in to double up.

THIS IS THE TIME TO PLAY WITH THE HEART OF A LION AND THE MIND OF A PSYCHIC.

This is tighten up time for the average player with the average to better stack. Middle stacks don't want to squander what they've earned. And both big stacks and short stacks will exploit the middle stack's tightness.

Let's put you in the shoes of the triple -pper. You found one fish early for all his chips (tasty!), and used your economic leverage to grind up 6 or seven pots without any serious payoffs.

As the blinds slowly rise, you will notice that with 2 or 3 limp ins, that pot increases to a value that would have been a damn big pot an hour ago. For a short stack, 3 limpers is a goldmine of weakness waiting to give up a meager investment for a pot which will give him time to find a real opportunity. Expect shortie in late position to steal, probably with an all -n move: only the trappers out there have enough value in their hand or the big stacks enough equity, to justify the gamble. Big stacks will do the same thing to you Mr. Tight Limp: "you want to see a flop? for cheap? Why don't I put you all in and see how you like your hand?"

Big stacks will raise often to 450 or so with 50/100 blinds because a stack with 3000 chips needs a very strong hand to call and a monster to raise. They are more than happy to randomly push off short stacks, and the good ones have found their targets.

You may be a middle stack. THINK LIKE A BIG STACK.

Start with a simple rule. If this is a hand you would only limp in in early or middle position, RAISE IT or FOLD IT. You can no longer limp in safely, and 3 limps = one big bet steal.

If you raise it, you have a few advantages:

• You are representing a stronger hand than you have, which will be very useful if you get called;
• suddenly short stack is scared off unless really desperate or was begging for the raise to showdown a hand.
• You are protecting your hand from a BB special flopping huge against what you would normally expect to have been your flop.
  

When to raise it?

• You have to understand your table. You know who the tight, predictable middle stacks are. They may not be all that experienced, and not realize that limpers will be prosecuted (and persecuted) at this level.
• Short stacks who are all-in frequently will avoid you, and so will patient ones, but if they are in the blinds, be cautious. If one limped in early position, be cautious. A limping short stack in early position either he forgot he was short and limped a hand he would normally limp, or he has a premium hand and is begging to spring the trap (I have been both). These players either have invested or are about to invest a significant portion of their stacks into the blinds, and can be easily pot committed.
• Big stacks come in various personality types. Most will call a modest raise with an interesting hand in the BB or in position. Very aggressive ones control middle stacks with reraises with or without a hand. Some are very patient and reasonable with their play (they play good hands very well and maximize payment with huge hands, instead of relying on bullying and bluffing). Ideally, your have position on the table big stack, and he has folded, because often the only way to outplay the big stack post-flop is with a bet he can't call (which usually commits your stack to the pot, all in or not)

What to raise with?

• Rather than go into detail, Sklansky and Miller's book on hold'em theory, as well as a million hits on google, discuss Sklansky-Chubokov numbers which are ratings for all in hands. I won't bother you with the math, but it is worth understanding these numbers. You may have seen big stacks make calls with awfully bad hands. I am not advocating these donkeys' ultra-loose play, only illustrating a point. If you must raise a flop-seeing hand, raise with something that will most likely have showdown value or two live cards based on the range of hands, especially, you expect short stacks to call in case one re-raises you.
• The classic desperate short stack has a limited range of showdown hands, since he expects a "pot odds" call most of the time. ANY ACE. TWO MIXED PAINT. ANY POCKET PAIR. For the truly desperate, TWO RANDOM CARDS, usually one is PAINT
  
• (sorry, PAINT refers to face cards, and I use the term MIXED PAINT to refer to the whole mix of K down to J (and sometimes 10) when they are unpaired in the hole)
  
• Naturally, you don't want to raise ANY ACE other than AK or AQ (maybe AJ) if you feel it is likely to be called by a short stack, but you DO if this is not a large risk. Playing two large cards on a limp in invites the SB and BB to make a hand on any medium-low flop, sometimes a huge 2 pr with 2 random cards to go with your kicker-high flop You will note I have given two examples of raising AJ and A10 in early position. It is for this reason that I do so, as well as force other plays to define their hand preflop a bit)
  
• Given that any pocket pair will be raised by a short stack, often vastly overbet for its actual value: the smaller the PP, often, the bigger the raise sometimes. This is because they are difficult to play post flop, and the short stack is the short stack because he doesn't have those skills. This chapter intends to discuss those skills. Generally speaking, the hands we are talking about are ones I have already discussed: Q10, K10 KJ, J9 (rarely, if you like a gamble: I like a gamble) QJ can very likely be two live against a PP or ANY ACE, offering you 40% to 50% to win your screwed up raise.
• Similarly, raising a PP which you would normally just limp in earlier has 50% odds to beat any two random overcards, and it's never terrible to win a small pre-flop pot raising them. While I raised 44 in middle in my turbo satellite late to knock out a final 20 player on a coinflip, I am generally speaking of 99, 88, 77, maybe 66. DEFINITELY RAISE 10 10 and JJ. Feel free to limp your smaller PP,s and you can decide, if a short stack pushes against it, whether the size of his stack justifies the guaranteed coin flip or worse. 10 10 to 66 have the advantage of dominating the majority of A-x combinations, all of which get pushed by short stacks, and, ideally, your 77 just got called by A7.
• Raise and call these hands the same way as you raise with AK or QQ. Your opponents will have to respect that you may have such a premium hand. Ideally, you can outplay someone on the flop without showing down the hand, and maintain the illusion, but the reverse is also true. Exposing the odd "questionable" raise might just get your AA re-raised later.
  
• Make these raises in any position, keeping in mind that the earlier your position, and the more desperate the field in front of you, or the wilder the table, the more likely you will get a playback you do not like.
• Using these hands in late position as a "blind steal" is intended to defeat the Phil Gordon generality "Push back with any Ace when a raise opens the pot on the button or the cut- off( the seat just before the button)" because these hands are not garbage, and can defeat "any ace", and your hand selection tries to minimize the prospect of being dominated. I am not a garbage blind stealer, but I have been known to do it rarely when required or opportunity strikes.
• Keep in mind that it is sometimes the case that everyone folded to you in the cut off, where you have 88 or AJ waiting, because all the good hands were concentrated in from of you. I have done the AK all-in here (or in the SB) on more than a few occassions to have AA and KK look me up.
  
• Mix up your bet sizes, and focus that size on your intentions: if you want heads-up action, raise a limper 3-4x the blinds, and you will likey get the field to fold to the one limper. This is ideal for the hands we are discussing. If you are stealing the blinds, the best people in the blinds are medium stacks and tight, patient players. Only raise a truly pot committed BB or SB with a hand that has some real showdown value against a desperate player, because you will be called and garbage exposed will mean no respect for your next steal. At least a decent ace, two mixed paint, or a pocket pair. If you want to push a big stack out of the pot who is in the blinds with a short stack, your raise may have to be enough to commit you to the pot, which says, "If you coma knockin' I'll coma rockin".
  
• Mix up where you raise in terms of positions.
  

Let me illustrate this last point. On Saturday, the same player I sucked the nut flush on the river on, a creative player, got predictable. It started with a mistake. He liked to raise in very early, almost always a little more than 2x the blind. I called a 500 bet with QJ hearts and saw a Q high flop, and chose to call his continuation bet on the flop. Often, the average player slows down on the smooth call from the big stack, and I get a read on whether I'm good but Loose and Lively here decided to keep on the charade, and did a good job of it. With an 8 on the turn, he bet again, a good bet designed to build a pot and not take the pot down. I'm still floating with top pr, and call, looking for that opening. With a K scare card on the river, he bet 5000, and I couldn't call. His mistake was to show the 6-8 he was playing to the whole table.

Now, every time he made the same early play, which was often, we all either called or raised, and he was forced to fold or play a draw out of position. He wasn't raising with trash, he was raising with interesting drawing cards and using his early position raise to control the next round of betting and undermine the benefit of position his opponent had. He could represent a made hand while bluffing or drawing. This is Gus Hanson stuff, but Gus don't show his stuff unless he shows down the draw with the nuts for all your chips.

Ironically, when he did this UTG raise with AA, he was called by short stack with 66 and got sucked out on, and eventually was forced to gamble with hands all in preflop just to play, because he refused to mix up his play. His stack went up and down. Sometimes he sucked out on QQ himself. This guy, none the less, became a target for short stacks to double up (including me at one point...I didn't exactly say I won the damn thing) all because of one display of what he was raising with and a lack of creativity or a real poker face (he always grimaced when he was raised and folded until he start to just resign himself to a show down suck out attempt preflop on every hand)

I have already discussed raising PPs in the early middle rounds, but don't always raise them. Two prime examples of how to play a small PP in an unraised pot.

Blinds are 200-400, the table is still tight, very little theft, there is one limper and I, in a moderate stack of about 12,000 (we started with 5000), see 55 in the hole. I limp this in. Two later positions call and the blinds call or check.

The flop is 10-7-7 rainbow.

No one looks enthoused, but I am interested. This is a trouble flop. the only person likely to have a 7 is the SB or BB, who both got cheap looks. The only one likely to bet has a 10, and then only moderately, as the BB special is a huge risk. I have a solid image. The blinds and limper check, I check, and the later positions do the same. No 10 came out betting.

The turn is a 2 of spades, making a spade flush draw, Check Check Check. The big stack in late position looks DISGUSTED with this board. Good. He is the one most likely to play back. I am satisfied there is no 7 out there, and no 10, and bet out 2200 confidently. I get all folds.

I was probably best hand there, but more importantly, I had a read of the full table. And I represented A7 suited, whose limped-in flush expedition had caught a huge hand, and the trap needed protection from a free flush for someone else on the river. Only the big stack was likely to pay that price for 18% left on a flush draw with a board paired and a bet that looks like I spring from a trap.

With caution, precision betting, and solid image, I took down a pot on a very scary board. This is how a low PP needs to be played.

Another prime example.

Last Saturday, again 200-400 blinds, I'm chipped up and table captain, in the SB. UTB and #4(Early Man) both limp in (does he ever get a hand in late position?). The rest of the table folds and I check my hole cards.

88. Nice hand. Terrible position.

I limp in too, and the BB checks

Flop is 733, two diamonds.

I like this flop. Nice flop for 88 with the overpair. I look up. I seem to be the only one with a "nice flop" look on his face. I reach for chips, and watch my opponents (I should mention I am at seat 2 at the time , on the same side as the dealer and a little offset from the edge. This, and 9 are great seats because you can see most of the player's facial expressions as they are across the table). I calculate my bet, and decide roughly pot size will do: 1800 get dramatically splashed into the pot (I love real chips. Play for real, folks) I get 3 folds, and Early Man says, "You must have had the 3. You were representing the 3"

"Nope, two eights" I tell him, and show it.

"I had you beat, but I couldn't call. You had the 3."

The player to my left, a spunky 32ish female with a lot of game, wonders why I didn't raise it.

"I didn't want to get caught in a trap" I respond.

This was a lie.

I LOVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LIMP A SMALL PP THROUGH THE SB OR BB.

My hand is completely disguised. If I flop a huge set, I can act the part of the disappointed SB or BB holder and set up a huge check-raise trap, especially at this 200/400/50 ante stage, where short stacks make their moves, and pots start to be taken down post-flop with larger bets.

If the flop is nasty, there is no risk. I was paying the blind anyway.

Early Man didn't say, but he must have limped 99. Had I raised here, he calls at least, and maybe I can outplay him on that 7 high flop, maybe I pay off, but I can't represent that 3 protecting a flush draw, can I?

At this stage SNEAKY AND EVIL with hands that can bust out a huge pot for you GETS YOU PAID.

These are tough, 4- and 5-handed examples of playing a small pocket pair well without hitting the set. We have already discussed hitting the set and using your read of a strong over-pair to get paid in full.

88 and 99, raised, can represent a huge range of hands. They won't always hit, but you don't want to give up a pot just because you see an overcard. Here's where your well honed hand reading psychic abilities will either win you the pot, or get you killed.

And here's where a reputation as a SNEAKY AND EVIL player WHO GETS PAYS pay off most when in fact what you want is a clean take of a reasonable pot post-flop and not a showdown.

Okay, you raised 77 early and got the one caller in position you wanted. Lets say you didn't like the call. The guy is tight and must have a hand.

The tight guy is cautious and you must use his caution against him.

Lets put him (accurately) on JJ.

Lets give us a nasty flop.

A -8 - 4 two hearts.

If you continue your bet here (lets hope you have him stacked) with a solid 3/4 pot bet reasonably quickly and confidently, (again, use that chip counting exercise to buy you time to read, live or on-line, and then make a PRECISION BET (not just press the bet pot button in a hurry, that is the wrong bet. It always looks like a bluff).

If your read was dead right, JJ has to fold.

OR

Check that flop.

If he makes a timid bet, consider a big check-raise. But watch out. The timid bet disguises a monster hand from the tricky player. But don't play this hand this way against Mr. Tricky. Play it against Mr. Tight and Predictable. See what I did against QQ with the K on board holding QK as an example from an earlier blog. The fact that I made my hand is irrelevant.

Lets put Mr. Tight on AK or AQ now. This guys so tight he folds AJ all the time against any resistance! And he must catch a flop or he caves, routinely. He is not pot committed.

Here's your flop.

J -8 -2 rainbow.

Play the same hand the same way as if you put him on JJ and the flop caught the A Just don't ALWAYS check raise or ALWAYS bet in these situations, or you suffer the fate of Loose and Lucky and all predictable players. You will walk into a trap.

Now, here's how to do it wrong, to end the chapter.

Its last Sundays big money on-line game, and I suffered through the slowest, tightest starting table in the early going. These tables suck. No chips move, and the play is so slow you can't see enough hands to find one worth playing yourself. I have "chipped up" to 3000 from 2500 after an hour of dull play.

So, its early middle play and I have employed the above strategies to out play some tight players and grind up to a reasonable 5500 chips. Blinds are now 75/150

Its so tight I can still limp, and UTG I have 77, and limp it in. There are no raisers. The BB is the biggest stack at the table. I don't know how all that tight action chipped her up to 11k, but it did.

Flop is 9-6-2 and BB makes a bet of 200. I put her on a weak 9, and decide to test her by playing back. I raise to 875 and get the call.

The Turn is a K which creates a flush draw, and she checks.

I decide to represent the early bluff which caught the K, and make a bet, but I sized this bet poorly. I bet 1200 into a pot of about 2200.

This is a poor bet. Because this is a good player, a tourney I had to earn my way in, it was too cautious. The right bet here is all in.

I am called, and on the river (its not a 7), my opponent makes a PERFECT BET. I have 3200 left. Her bet has nothing to do with the size of the pot. It is 1600. I am left with a choice. I have a playable 3200 left, having squandered strong grinding play, and can fold to try again, losing table image in doing so, but alive, or I can commit 77 and my tourney with several overcards on the board, and having made my lady on the 9 in the first place. If I go all in, she is priced in and will call. She clearly has me overplaying my small PP and is begging the all in.

This is the message she communicated. "I dare you to make your move, but you can't bluff your way of this mess. I will be calling."

NB, I typed, and mucked. I never made a pot again.

We will discuss strong play out of the blinds, like this, when I continue this chapter.