Hello again. Late middle tournament play, or crisis time, is so fundamental to winning and losing a tournament, it may require quite a few subchapters.
This blog I intend to discuss early position hands and raises in the hands just before and during crisis time.
As I have described and you have seen, the table tends to be very tight in early middle play. As the blinds are not worth stealing, the preflop raises are not huge because they are designed to generate the correct type of action, and smaller percentages of your stack are required to make bets which will win pots.
It is important that you recognise the transition period between the two, which is often the first level containing antes, and begin to adjust your play accordingly.
In the last blog, I had introduced the concept of bet sizes calculated to generate certain responses. The obvious counterpoint to that is to play in a manner which will disguise raises intended to get callers and raises intended to get everyone to fold.
Early position raises are very difficult because you have the majority of the table to consider concerning your response. For this reason, as the crisis mounts and more and more hands are subject to raises and theft, early position monsters tend to get sneaky.
It is a well established concept that early position raises should represent strong hands because they will play post flop out of position of most callers. This is less of a consideration at crisis time: the real concern is that with 6-9 players left to act, the raiser will run into a serious showdown hand, so he better have one himself.
We have seen a lot of instances where early position raisers have attempted to use this tactic to disguise the weakness of their hand. This only works to a point, and any showdown of this weak hand will undermine their credibility: We saw Loose and Lucky do it routinely with modest drawing hands, and he was pushed around ever since. I recall being at a table where a player was 2 seats to my left and frequently raised, very large to all in, with small PP's from early position while I was in the blinds. I used this information to my advantage with 10 10 in the BB, knowing that he had pushed with a small PP and that I was a huge favorite. I was right.
In described calling 22 with AA in the last blog. It is clear that his raise was designed to discourage calling, as 10,000 at that table represented 25%-50% of all the players' stacks. This guy had 26000 chips, and he could afford to fold. While a steal offered up 4000 more, this obvious a steal from this position was a very bad gamble. I am sure he knew his caller had a very big hand. AK reraises here. The call was an obvious trap to everyone, but he had trapped himself with a very weak hand. Even I had had QQ, I might have a hard time getting away from my hand in such a large pot with a K on the flop. Just as his raise committed himself to the pot, my call declared a similar commitment.
The moral to this story is that very small to small pocket pairs are very difficult to play in early position. If I am deep stacked, I will play for cheap, limping them in or offering a small raise to help me see what I am up against. If I get action from a short stack, I may gamble. Larger stacks may wish to see a flop. I can drop it against a strong reraise. I will dump it completely preflop if only medium stacked and commit my chips to better opportunities. I may go all in and pray for no callers or a coinflip opportunity if seriously short stacked.
The limp-in and modest raises to open the pot, in fact, disguise my little PP as a much bigger hand attempting to trap! I may get a surprising amount of folders and even take the pot down with a minraise. All players are suspicious of a minraise at this stage as a compromise between a limp trap which might produce a BB special and a proper raise to protect a big hand from getting the wrong kind, and too much, action. This is particularly if I am getting table respect. I will do this with QK and KJ as well, and often find only the BB calls, and when a card I can represent, including an A, hits the flop, and the BB checks (and for some reason I can tell a "please take the pot" check from a "please bet, I am trapping" check, usually by the pause, and this is just long experience on line) A bet of almost any value usually wins the pot whether I have hit or not. This is the level of fear of traps out there in crisis time.
At the same time, making early and middle position raises often in the hands leading up the crisis, and playing them well, provides that necessary table image. This DOES NOT MEAN WINNING EVERY POT AND SHOWING DOWN THE NUTS. THIS INCLUDES THE WILLINGNESS TO CHECK AND FOLD POST FLOP IN POTS YOU OPENED WITH A RAISE.
By doing this, you will do three things:
- Appear to be willing to raise early with less than perfect hands you can get away from;
- Make a post flop bet more likely to induce a fold, as it will be more likely to be respected;
- Allow you to check-call, check-raise, and bet small to induce in-position players to bet into your monster hands and huge flops.
It is late into the $200+9 this past Sunday, and I have a modest stack of about 12k. I have been snake bitten after an early fast start, with AQ losing a huge pot to KK on a Q high flop in the second hour, leading to grinding but effective play to chip back up and corresponding table respect. In 4th position with blinds of 300/600, after a number of small grinding pots and steals at this table, I raise to 1800 with 66, and get two bigger stacks calling, as well as the SB, with less than my raise left, pot committed.
Because I have been raising regularly, and the modest state of my stack, I got the action which I did not necessarily want, but I did get the flop. 967 with 2 hearts.
My error here was in conservative play. I pushed all in to protect my set from a flush draw. Because I have table respect, I am put on a big hand and the bigger stacks fold. I regret not gambling with a trapping play, only because the SB sucked out a runner runner straight and took most of the pot from me, but the pot repesented a near double up as it was, and better to be safe than greedy. Greed Kills is my motto, even when I regret a conservative play.
Regardless, showing down 66 in that situation where I had raised was information I was happy to share with the table, because similar raises in similar positions are more likely to get action or suggest I will call raises with more modest hands and gamble out of position in this crucial period.
This is, of course, misinformation.
Unlike the typical "loose aggressive" player who has made his chips with big bets and big folds without necessarily good cards, and we have all seen these donkeys, and get mad when they get lucky, this period is revenge time for the more "solid", i.e. "timid" player once he finally gets that hand he can push all-in with. I have seen so many of these "loose aggressive" types fail to change gears and go from chip leader to chump very rapidly as badly conceived attempted steals equal big payoffs against players with hands they are willing to show down. Sometimes these donkeys get lucky, but more often they pay off.
PokerMonster is, of course, very aware of the nature of crisis time, so he has constructed the image of the "loose aggressive" player TO GET ACTION WHEN HE WANTS IT. I am still scary enough to induce folding when I want to steal and I feel stealing is the right move, but if I have people willing to see a flop with me, especially when I give up position, I am setting them up for monster hands and huge flops leading to big pot takedowns which will move me up the ladder. I am just as selective as the next guy in crisis time, but I mix up my play with the same hands.
(This is, of course, exactly the opposite advice from Phil Gordon. Phil Gordon has just one bracelet, and will be the first to tell you he is a chump at a table of real pros. Tight image to induce folds in crisis time gets you blinds and antes, but never the big pots needed to obtain the stack needed to make and win the final table. Follow Phil and play to get to the money bubble. Follow me and I'll meet you at the final table)
Here is another example from about 15 hands later in the same tournament. I am still stuck at 12,000 (thank you so much Lady Luck!) and in the SB with 22. Yes, Quack Quack, the same hand I destroyed in the last blog.
Blinds are 400/800/100 ante, and 5th position comes in with a modest raise of 2000. The whole table, and I, suspect the trap. The bet was far too low to induce folds. He is begging for action, but fears a BB special. The whole table folds to me. It does not take much to induce me to call only 1200. A BB special you shall have!
In this situation I am looking for a low flop, presumably to defeat AK post flop, but I don't have this player on AK. I, like many players, do not treat AK as a trapping hand. I raise AK big to open pots from all but the late positions: AK is very powerful in crisis time, because holding AK limits the prospects of AA and KK being at the table significantly (but as we have seen from blog 1, this is no guarantee) and what I really want is action from short stacks holding the best hand they have seen in an hour, often AQ-A9 or a small pocket pair. And it is far easier to play AK in a showdown, and far safer against a small stack.
So my mark does not have AK. He has a monster PP. I am pretty satisfied that I will need to flop huge here, but I have an excellent price to do it.
The flop is beautiful. 2-3-4 Rainbow. I immediately think straight draw, but only if my opponent has an Ace, and if he has one, he has two. He definitely DOES NOT HAVE A5 or 56.
I check, and my mark value bets, about 1600. I simply call, as I am not concerned about my mark having any sort of draw in this flop. The turn is the 6 of diamonds, which is interesting, as it put 2 diamonds on the board and improved the straight opportunity. Given that I have demonstrated a gambling nature, and the board is now drawing potentially for me, my prior call on the flop and check on the turn, suggesting I am still drawing (perhaps I have an Ace), produce a panic reaction from my mark. He now wants to end this hand now. He makes an excellent bet, he thinks, 4000: as I have 8000 left he has put me in an "all - in or fold" decision on what he thinks is a draw. I am able to spring my trap, and reraise all -in: he discovers he has now committed himself to the pot, and has to make the call.
He turns over QQ. I am unsurprised, and amused by my genius. Then the 5 hits the river and we split. Lady Luck has been kinder to PokerMonster. If I make both sets I described, I would have been chipped up to 40,000 - 60,000 (depending on whether my set of 6s attracted big stack action: I would have trapped but for the flush draw) and in excellent position with 180 left, 100 in the money, and $150,000 sitting on the final table. Instead I made it into the money.
You can see that QQ was unable to put me on a hand. He assumed I called with Ace high, and, in the situation of that flop, an A has at least 7 outs against QQ, 3 aces and 4 fives, and AK, with 3 Kings, has 10. You can see why he panicked a bit on the turn. I was able to disguise my set as a draw, and his bet was designed to give me very bad odds to catch it.
This, and the next example, show how the big PP trap has its defects. I thought I had successfully disguised myself in the next hand, which occurred later that day in a $100+9 game with 140 players. These games are tighter than the $200+9 for some reason, and it took 3 hours to grind to a modest stack of 12,000 with only one significant boost when my stack of 7000 holding AK made a modest raise to open the pot and called an all-too-quick all in response from the player to the left with 4000 chips: he had QK. Oops.
Anyway, with blinds 150/300/25 ante, I had just raised to open the pot with 3x the blind bets on two prior hands, got action, bad flops, and checked to a bet post flop and folded. I had set up my trap, but I was also down to 8500 chips.
The opportunity comes a few hands later.
The player to my right opened the pot with 900, a dull, standard BY THE BOOK preflop raise (I like to mix up my numbers, and like in this situation, 1100), and I have AA. I simply call.
The flop is a nasty K J 10 rainbow. I do not like this flop, nor do I like the response of my "mark": a "value" bet of 685.
Any small bet which begs a call is suspicious. Sometimes they are probe bets, but more often they are value bets from big flops trying to generate more action. My immediate thought is AQ. I sense serious trouble here. What is really unfortunate is I have AA, and I can't lay down again. I am pot committed because I need AA to hold up this time.
I make the call. The turn is an irrelevant card. He checks and I decide to bet, 2000, praying I am wrong. He reraises me, and I have to put my chips in.
I was almost right. He had 10 10. I definitely smelled the trap.
Developing "set radar" is one of my first acquired skills. I often make the trapping value bet myself with a set when I have the right flop to trap a big PP or if AK or AQ hit top pair. The pros talk about a big bet here, but I like about 2/3 the pot. This value bet was LOW, which triggered my spidey sense. Other triggers are the smooth call in position when you have top pair A kicker and there is NO DRAW ON THE BOARD, and the similar check raise in a multi-player pot when the next player bets and the following calls, WHEN THERE IS A DRAW ON THE BOARD (because player 2 had top pair, and player 3 had the draw, and the set holder wants to push the drawer out, and hopes the top pair has a good enough kicker and not enough common sense to get the hell out too). Heads up, the early player with a set can check call on a drawing flop, as the drawer will likely see a free card, while a made hand bets to protect himself, thus identifying his hand as either top pair or a semi bluff, either of which usually lead to the check-raise, big enough to force the draw out but entice top pair).
Given my predicament, and his hand, I think he played it poorly. I could have had AQ easily given the nature of play. If not, there is a huge draw potential for QK (a likely caller) or QJ (a possible caller). This is potentially the kind of set vs monster draw situation I described in earlier blogs. It is unlikely he had me on a hand, but he, like I, had a monster hand he was going to commit his tournament stakes to, and was willing to gamble himself. Obviously the safe turn card, and my bet which, like in the prior example, was intended to take the pot down, enabled his trap to spring, but I am tricky and just as likely to make that bet with the straight.
Given what I had, and my radar coming on after the post flop bet, should I have folded? I am really unwilling to fold AA in almost all situations. I am 6:1 likely to be ahead post flop with AA, and that is very good odds even without a read on your opponent: this is the luxury of AA. Even so, AA was not beat post flop, it was merely behind. 2 aces and 4 Queens remained available to suckout, about 25% with 2 cards to go, and my AA has caught up from time to time.
One last comment on flops like that K J 10. People tend to play AK, AQ, AJ, A10 as simple "top pair top kicker" ABC hands, and fail to see their potential as drawing hands for straights. I have seen AK and AQ showdown so many times, and AQ vs. KJ, I cannot ignore this potential.
While these two showdown situations appear to offer a clear favorite, these high flops really can alter the odds significantly, because the competing hole cards are interlocking: they contain straight draw outs for the other player, and when two of the cards that make the top end straight (A-K-Q-J-10) hit the flop, one player's top pair or two pair is the other's straight draw, and an overcard and an open ended straight draw, such as AQ vs KJ with a flop of Q-10-rag, is only a 62% favorite with 2 cards to go.
What is most bizarre, and defies both common sense and math, is how many times I have seen the following scenario play out as if scripted:
- AK and AQ go all in preflop
- flop is K-J-rag
- turn or river is the 10 (usually the turn)
The ghost in the machine? Evidence of a Goddess of Poker?
Happy pokering.
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